Romania’s strategic value on NATO’s eastern flank and its dual anchoring in the European Union and the transatlantic partnership make it one of the most consequential actors in Central and Eastern Europe today, according to Jörn Fleck, Senior Director of the Europe Center and of the Transform Europe Initiative at the Atlantic Council. Speaking to CaleaEuropeană.ro in Bucharest, during Central Europe Week event of the Atlantic Council, Fleck underlined that Romania has “always stood out” for being “fully in on the transatlantic dimension and fully in on the European Union dimension,” arguing that this long-term commitment to both tracks “continues to be the smart thing to do,” even as domestic debates in Romania question whether the country should tilt more decisively toward Washington or Brussels.
Taking a broader European perspective, Fleck said it is “obvious to many outside Romania that Romania has really stepped up,” pointing both to its role at EU level and to its support for Ukraine. He highlighted Romania’s “uniquely positioned” role as a neighbor of Ukraine, emphasizing the strategic relevance of “certain ports and the Danube infrastructure,” as well as the country’s growing importance for Black Sea security.
In this context, he drew a direct comparison with Poland, noting that while Poland has become “a huge success story” on the northeastern end of NATO’s eastern flank, “what Poland has done on the northeastern flank or front, I think Romania is rapidly leaning into a role that it could replicate on the southeastern end of that flank,” a development that would give Bucharest “a lot more influence and reach in Washington DC as well.”
At the same time, Fleck placed Romania’s trajectory within the wider debate about Europe’s future direction and its role in the transatlantic partnership.
While discussions about “two-speed or multi-speed or core Europe” have resurfaced across the continent, including in major capitals, he said he is “personally not a big fan” of theoretical or treaty-driven divisions. Instead, he argued that Europe has historically advanced through “practical cooperation built around countries willing to move ahead and then expand,” recalling that Schengen, the euro, and security cooperation all began with smaller groups before being broadened.
Referring to emerging challenges in the areas of technology, security, and defense, Fleck emphasized that these issues can no longer be treated separately from the geopolitical and security agenda. He noted that topics such as digital technologies, artificial intelligence, and critical supply chains, including critical raw materials, are increasingly viewed through the lens of national security, particularly in Washington, and warned that Europe needs to adopt a “more ambitious and more comprehensive” approach in this field. At the same time, in the context of US calls for Europe to assume greater responsibility for conventional defense, Fleck highlighted the need to strengthen Europe’s defense industrial base and to capitalize on transatlantic synergies, stressing that NATO remains an essential pillar for “preserving, building out, and upgrading” Euro-Atlantic security.
Ultimately, Fleck warned against any temptation—whether in Europe or in Washington—to see fragmentation as an advantage.
“Whatever short-term gains any one administration or political actor in the United States thinks it can get out of a more divided Europe,” he said, “that’s very short-sighted”.
In his view, “a united Europe in the long term is better for the United States” and “also better for Europe,” especially at a moment when Europe is being called upon to take greater responsibility for its own security while remaining a “real strategic asset” for the transatlantic alliance.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: We have together with us today a very special guest from the Atlantic Council. Mr. Jörn Fleck, Senior Director of the Europe Center and of Transform Europe initiative within the Atlantic Council. Mr. Fleck, thank you for being together with us here in the Bucharest office of the Atlantic Council and thank you for this interview.
Jörn Fleck: Thank you for having me.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: This week you have a duplex, a joint event with Atlantic Council’s Central Europe Week in Warsaw and Bucharest. I would like to start with that. Zooming out with this role of the Atlantic Council in trying to make Central Europe and Eastern Europe more vocal on the transatlantic arena and in the debate, what is the idea behind Central Europe Week, and how does this initiative seek to reposition the region from a policy recipient to a strategic agenda setter, both in Washington and in Brussels?
Jörn Fleck: Well, thank you for highlighting Central Europe Week. That’s a week-long series of programming. Actually, this year we’re starting in Bucharest, we’re going to Warsaw, and we’ll end up in Prague with discussions around some of the key issues impacting Central Europe, Europe, and the transatlantic partnership.
This program is very much focused on the region’s role in security and defense for Europe, on the economic vibrancy and resilience of the region, but also Europe writ large, and the political leadership that really the region has brought to many of these issues. This region was first to see the Russian threat for what it really is and has been before many others in Europe. This region has acted upon that before everyone else.
This region has also been a key driver of European economic dynamism, of technology leadership, and innovation in many areas. We really want to highlight those experiences and what they can contribute to a more forward-leaning Europe and a rebalanced transatlantic partnership.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: You put a lot of layers in our discussion – both security and defense, also economy. I would say that this field has a buzzword in the European Union. It’s competitiveness now. We have a lot of debates on that, including in relation with Washington. Recent moments at a transatlantic level, from Greenland to Davos, have exposed frictions and tensions within the alignment that we were supposed to see in Europe’s-U.S. relations. How do you read the current state of the transatlantic partnership under these umbrellas, and how influential is Central Europe’s collective voice in shaping debates in Washington today?
Jörn Fleck: That’s a lot of questions in one. Let me try and take them.
Number one, of course, we’ve seen significant disruption in the first 12 months of the Trump 2.0 administration in the relationship with Europe, in the overall global engagement and posture of the United States. I personally don’t think that should have surprised anyone. President Trump very clearly signaled that on the campaign trail and coming into office.
And it’s also not a Trump administration-specific set of issues. We’ve heard about re-prioritization, and we’ve heard about the need for Europe to step up and to rebalance within the NATO alliance for a long time from Democratic and Republican administrations. But the Trump 2.0 administration has been the first to really push through and follow through on these demands and policy shifts.
I think Europe overall has adapted and managed this much more effectively than maybe Europe gives itself credit for – on NATO and 5% defense spending, on where we are today, on how the United States, Ukraine, and Europe are approaching negotiations for a settlement of Russia’s continued war, and where Europe is going on its competitiveness agenda and trade diversification and other economic issues.
Again, could Europe be doing even better, be more ambitious, even more effective? For sure. But I think we have trend lines that are pointing in the right direction.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: Don’t talk the talk, walk the talk.
Jörn Fleck: Walk the walk, you know, and we need to see more ambition there. We can discuss that in more detail.
Overall, I think it’s important for Europe to take the long view, also for the United States to take the long view on this relationship. I think we should not underestimate that, for all the rebalancing that’s needed, for all the changes in the relationship that we’ve known for a long time – they’ve had to happen, and they’re beginning to happen now – that ultimately in this relationship, we have a unique strategic asset, both for the United States and for Europe. None of our strategic competitors have that kind of asset in such a deep and wide relationship.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: Do you feel that deep down both Washington and European capitals understand this profound link? Because when we see it at the surface of the political debate, political discourse, we see the tendency to break apart.
Jörn Fleck: Look, I think some parts of the shock therapy from the United States, from this administration, is maybe overshooting. And it’s encouraging the worst actors, elements, and reflexes on both sides. That, I think, needs to be recalibrated, needs to be adjusted.
At the same time, I think Europe has understood that it needs to take a much greater share of the burden and responsibility, really, for its own security. And that’s fundamentally a good thing. I think that will also contribute to a healthier relationship over the medium to long term.
I think we need to step a little bit back from the immediate emotions and focus on what we’ve already achieved and what we need to achieve from a European and transatlantic perspective. None of this is pretty or easy. The tensions are real, and the emotions are real. That’s because we’ve come to expect a lot more from each other. But that’s okay.
When it comes to the role of Central Europe that you asked about, I do think it’s even made explicit in the national security strategy.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: That’s my next point, so please go ahead…
Jörn Fleck: … That Central Europe is on a good way, and that this administration recognizes the role that Central Europe and different countries in that region have played on the security front, on the economic front. I think that’s all positive. But again, these countries, because of the administration’s focus on implementation and follow-through, need to also keep it up.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: This type of approach we already had in Trump 1.0. We know that he met at the NATO London Summit with the two percenters back then—the countries that were spending at least 2% of GDP on defense, which were the countries on the Eastern flank. We also know the involvement that the US administration within the first Trump tenure had within the Three Seas Initiative, for instance. The reason I ask you about how you see Central Europe having a collective voice is because, when we look through lenses of the national security strategy that you invoked, the United States wants to reconnect better with countries that try, let’s say, to challenge the current Brussels leadership. Considering that and looking at the specifics of our region, do you see this as a momentum of Central Europe having a collective voice, or playing, let’s say, individual voices because of this approach?
Jörn Fleck: I think there are some important similarities and shared challenges that this very diverse region has. And then there’s obviously individual perspectives and dynamics in the relationship and the national outlook between, if you take the Three Seas countries as an example, the Baltics on the one hand and Poland and Czech Republic, and for example, Romania on the southeastern end of that geographical range.
There are important differences. There are also some important similarities. And that’s where I think the region as a whole can try and work on some of the priorities that are very much aligned with the administration’s America First approach—not America alone.
And that’s on the energy and infrastructure front, that’s on the security and defense front, where there are important opportunities, and where priorities of the administration for Europe writ large – for example, on the energy and infrastructure set of issues – do align. I think we need to slightly reinvent the Three Seas initiative.
I think whenever the United States tries to insert ideological or partisan elements into its relations with individual countries – not just in Europe – I think leaderships need to keep in mind that all countries have a relationship with the United States and not just one administration.
So what these countries do at the EU level, I think we just have very different perspectives there from different member states. And that has to be negotiated through the European policy element and approach of these countries. You need to do that for your own country, not for this or that US administration, in all honesty.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: Since you brought the discussion on how a country should follow its national interest in this way, we also see the new Romanian security and defense strategy that was released last year with this independence and solidarity concept within the strategy, I would like to bring the focus to Romania. We know that our country has often been cited as a frontline state, an island of stability, and also with growing strategic relevance. How do you see Romania with the new administration – both in Washington and Bucharest – more effectively projecting and playing its interests and expertise in Washington, Brussels, and in between them?
Jörn Fleck: I’ve always looked at Romania for its unique role of being fully in on the transatlantic dimension and fully in on the European Union dimension. And I think that’s been a very smart approach.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: Is it a smart approach? We have a debate here in Romania right now calling for a more revolutionary approach, to maybe choose sides or maybe go with one side more than the other.
Jörn Fleck: I think Romania has stood out in recent years and decades, really. Certainly since it’s joining NATO and joining the EU, pursuing a strong commitment to both of these tracks. They continue to be complementary, I believe. Taking the long view on these relationships, NATO Alliance considerations, security and defense considerations, economic and even now defense industrial considerations – like Romania’s share of the SAFE instrument – pursuing that strong commitment to both tracks continues to be the smart thing to do.
I think it’s obvious to many outside Romania that Romania has really stepped up. It has played a key role at the EU level, but also at the national level in terms of support for Ukraine and keeping Ukraine in the fight.
What Romania has done as a neighbor and a uniquely positioned neighbor, especially when you look at certain ports and the Danube infrastructure and what it has allowed Ukraine to do, what Romania can do on Black Sea security – these are all huge opportunities.
There’s been so much attention on Poland. I think that’s a huge success story. But what Poland has done on the northeastern end of Central Europe and the NATO eastern front. Flank I should say, sorry.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: Some would prefer front.
Jörn Fleck: Some would prefer front, and it’s not entirely inadequate or inaccurate given Russian hybrid challenges and more. But what Poland has done on the northeastern flank or front, I think Romania is rapidly leaning into a role that it could replicate on the southeastern end of that flank. That will give Romania a lot more influence and reach in Washington DC as well, despite whatever political challenges there are.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: Although this would have been a great line to finish our interview, I still have two questions on technology and on security and defense. First, technology, but from a broader, transatlantic view. How do you see issues such as digital platforms, technological sovereignty, and artificial intelligence factor into today’s transatlantic tensions? And how can we turn these areas or engines to closer cooperation rather than competition, if we look at the global scale?
Jörn Fleck: Obviously, technology issues, and especially artificial intelligence, are part and parcel of national security and geopolitics. That’s very much the prism through which this US administration is looking at these issues.
If you see all of the efforts on technology, trade, and export control, on the relationship with China, and even its energy policy front, I think Europe needs to really prioritize these issues as part and parcel, integral to its own strategy, to put more weight and political heft and economic heft behind its geopolitical role.
In Europe, we’re still thinking of these maybe a little too narrowly as sort of an economic issue, or merely technology issues. I think there’s been a change over the last five plus years in how Europe approaches the issues, but it’s not been nearly as ambitious and far-reaching enough.
At the same time – on the idea of absolute European sovereignty or strategic autonomy – let’s focus on what Europe can achieve together with its allies. I still believe in the long term, the United States and Europe have shaped a unique economic relationship, and the technology part of that, and the innovation part and investment part, is still so deeply integrated between the two sides. That’s a strength for the United States and Europe when we see new challenges from China, for example, on critical sectors, critical raw materials, critical technology.
I think Europe needs to take an even more ambitious and comprehensive view of the role of technology in its geopolitical considerations. Trying to replicate something at home, Europe needs certain safeguards and greater security of supply on certain technologies and critical raw materials. I think the goal of autonomy is very far-fetched for an economy that’s very export-oriented, like the European Union.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: Security and defense – this is a line of mutual cooperation between both sides of the North Atlantic. Now, with the US calling for more conventional responsibility – not unconventional, not nuclear umbrella responsibilities – what do you think should be the next steps in NATO, in the EU-US relations and for countries here in Central Europe? How can this cooperation be further developed?
Jörn Fleck: I think it’s an important distinction you made. This administration has made it explicit, and I think intentionally, that Europe ought to step up and take primary responsibility for its own conventional defense and deterrence.
We’re seeing important countries across Europe trending in that direction and taking important steps. Europe, writ large, needs to figure out how best to address fragmentation in its defense industrial markets, still not fully integrated internally. It needs to rapidly address lessons learned from Ukraine, to factor that in, and build that into how it uses increased defense spending, especially these up to 800 billion euros under SAFE and REARM or Readiness 2030.
Really make the most of those lessons in terms of technology, innovation, and how to build that into a new enhanced defense industrial base. We’re doing a lot of work at the Europe Center and at the Atlantic Council through our Reimagining European Defense and Innovation Task Force.
As with the technology question, how do you make the most of synergies? Neither defense industrial base on either side of the Atlantic can handle the needs after decades of underinvestment alone. So how do we make the most? How do we build up a European defense industrial base? How do we ensure we get the most out of our American allies?
CaleaEuropeană.ro: Thank God we have NATO, right?
Jörn Fleck: Preserving, building out, updating, and upgrading NATO as much as possible from the European side, rather than assuming there are fundamental challenges.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: NATO 3.0, as President Stubb of Finland said, or is it too much?
Jörn Fleck: I’m a big fan, as on the EU side, of discussions around two-speed or multi-speed or core Europe.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: It has resurfaced—from Berlin, actually.
Jörn Fleck: I’m personally not a big fan. There are important debates to be had, even on these issues. But I’m a big fan of, and that’s how I believe Europe has actually been built over the last seven – eight decades.
Especially since the Big Bang expansion, it’s been less about theoretical concepts and much more about practical cooperation built around countries willing to move ahead and then expand. Even Schengen came out of a much smaller set of countries. The Euro as well. The origins of defense and security cooperation in Europe, police and judicial cooperation—it’s always, in many cases, been the way forward.
I think we should learn from that and not worry so much about theoretical or treaty concepts, rather find practical cooperation with real outputs for challenges Europe faces and for the transatlantic partnership, and figure out how we get effective responses. Then you can build that out, institutionalize it, codify it in treaties and reforms, and so on.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: I have a short follow-up. What would be better for transatlantic relations: a whole and united Europe, or a multi-speed Europe?
Jörn Fleck: For the United States or for transatlantic relations?
CaleaEuropeană.ro: Go with both.
Jörn Fleck: Whatever short-term gains any one administration or political actor in the United States thinks it can get out of a more divided Europe, I think that’s very short-sighted. Ultimately, even if Europe is a more weighty actor and more demanding once it has stepped up on security and defense, as we’ve already seen on the economy, it will still be a much more capable and useful partner, a real strategic asset for the United States, than a divided Europe. United Europe in the long term is better for the United States. It’s also better for Europe.
CaleaEuropeană.ro: Thank you very much for this interview, Mr. Jörn Fleck, Senior Director of Europe Center and of Transform Europe Initiative within the Atlantic Council.
Jörn Fleck: Thank you so much for having me.
