In the fifth year of Russia’s large-scale, high-intensity war in Ukraine, the new Israeli-American war against Iran is sending significant shockwaves through the Wider Black Sea Region, which are compounded by the well-known developments resulting from Russian aggression. The only good news is the increasingly clear outline of the defense and crisis management strategy that the states in the region are developing to counter the growing turbulence and tectonic shifts in the Black Sea. Formulas for revising regional cooperation are also affected by the global realignment and are evident in the obsolescence and dysfunction of the BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization), the transformation of the region into a zone of confrontation with an economic focus on the Russian shadow fleet, and efforts to reorient the MCM (Marine Counter-Mine) mission—the joint mine-clearing mission of NATO states in the area—toward the protection of critical marine and submarine infrastructure. Tensions remain regarding regional responsibility versus the allied and European role in defense, marked by the growing interest of the EU and the US in the Black Sea.
Constants and Developments in Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Ban on Russian Military Navigation and the Shadow Fleet
The Wider Black Sea Region has undergone significant changes in its composition and strategic orientations, particularly in the Caucasus, where the three states have shifted their focus. Russia has lost its presence and confidence, while Turkey and the United States have gained a strong presence and major influence, particularly following the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, their involvement in the Armenia-Azerbaijan relationship and the peace between the two states, as well as due to the tensions between those two states and Russia for distinct reasons. Azerbaijan faced significant irritants with the arrest and killing of leaders of its diaspora in Yekaterinburg, while Russia’s downing of the passenger plane bound for Chechnya had major effects on bilateral relations. Armenia accepted the American project and the European path. Georgia, on the other hand, has backtracked and is now courting Russia, though without any dividends in terms of territorial reunification.
Otherwise, we have the three NATO member states—Romania, Turkey, and Bulgaria—that have strengthened their cooperation in the Black Sea, particularly in the areas of mine countermeasures and the security of critical underwater and surface infrastructure; the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine are awaiting the European decision and the upcoming elections in Hungary to secure accelerated accession to the EU, while Russia remains largely isolated, with a major impact on its relations with third countries due to its war of aggression against Ukraine and the forcible alteration of borders in violation of international law.
Russia’s large-scale, high-intensity, long-term war of aggression in Ukraine has largely continued along familiar lines: a war of attrition, Russia’s suicidal and aimless assaults, and minimal territorial gains—at the start of the year, based on counterattacks, Ukraine itself has actually gained more territory and thwarted the spring-summer offensive, which has just recently begun. The battlefield is transparent, with thousands of drones, and drone warfare has become a constant, as has the fierce technological competition to dominate the other side. At the naval level, Russia faces a de facto navigation ban with its navy, which used to launch attacks against Ukraine from the open sea, due to Ukrainian naval drones that have decimated it. The problem also extends to ports, including oil terminals.
Significant changes are occurring as the gray zone expands: Ukraine has managed to enhance its drones and render unsafe not only the 20–30 km along the contact line, but the entire occupied territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, in Sumy and its northwest, of course, but also in Crimea. It can strike without difficulty as far as the Sea of Azov at any time and has the capacity to introduce instability, uncertainty, and control across its entire internationally recognized territory.
Furthermore, preventing further Russian expansion plans and temporarily reversing the trend of territorial losses is all the more critical given the enormous losses in personnel during Russia’s spring-summer offensive, with a record 1,700 casualties per day and 10,000 in a week, numbers that make the offensive unacceptable and extremely costly for any country. This does not mean that Ukraine has not preserved, but rather developed, its deep-strike capability, extending 4,000–5,000 km from its borders, bringing the war to the doorstep of every Russian living in the European part of the country, west of the Urals.
A trend identified some time ago but which has since become persistent and of significant strategic importance is the targeting of Russia’s shadow fleet—attacks that cause no casualties but immobilize vessels and prevent oil spills. Ukraine persists in this type of attack in the Black Sea, hunting these vessels on the EU’s sanctions list beyond territorial waters, before they enter the straits to reach the Mediterranean. On the other hand, Russia continues sporadic but constant attacks on ships trading through the existing corridor, targeting them in Ukrainian territorial waters without striking those of Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, which complete the transport corridor from Odessa to the straits. The port of Odessa and the small ports or port facilities on the Danube, including those near Romania, are a constant and unchanging target.
The War Against Iran: From Distraction to Putin’s Change of Heart
The launch of the Israeli-American coalition’s war against Iran proved to be a game-changer, a catalyst that, by extension, directly impacted Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and, consequently, the prospects for peace. First, the Gulf meetings that were supposed to continue in a trilateral U.S.-Russia-Ukraine format did not take place, and a pause ensued—at a time, it is true, when Russia was about to walk away from the table anyway on the grounds that Ukraine had not met the initial conditions for negotiations, namely withdrawal from the entire Donbas. The iron ring of Ukrainian defense cannot be abandoned to a Russia with no immediate and realistic prospects of conquering it, just as it is not possible to trade territory for security.
Recently, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy emphasized that the U.S. is making its security guarantees for Ukraine contingent on ceding territory to Russia—an unacceptable demand, though one that is much less visible today due to the effects of the war in Iran. Nor do the Europeans have many arguments or leverage to return to the Oval Office and secure a return to the established trilateral terms of the 20-point Ukraine-EU-US plan. The diversion of the world’s attention from Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and the rise in the price of oil—which effectively benefits Russia and helps stabilize its disastrous economic situation, should the war drag on—is altering the dynamics and prospects in the Wider Black Sea Region.
Now the main concern is the price of oil and gas and, more recently, transit through the Strait of Hormuz, compounded by mutual threats and Iran’s growing ambition to assert and have recognized its sovereignty over the strait, with plans to unilaterally impose taxes to rebuild the country. Of course, we cannot ignore President Trump’s statement announcing that he will control the Strait alongside a future Iranian ayatollah. However, the ambiguity of the purported negotiations keeps the outlook for the region unclear and unstable, as do the prices and the duration of their sustained rise. Nor do the threats to destroy the oil and gas resources or the refineries, terminals, and ports of the Gulf states bode well for the future.
On the other hand, these developments and drone attacks have given Ukraine leverage in its dealings with both the U.S. and the Gulf states. Two hundred Ukrainian specialists have arrived in the region to assist with technology transfer and to counter Iranian attack drones using cost-effective drone systems. This support brings Ukraine new allies—the Gulf states—as well as financiers for its production of attack drones and anti-drone drones, with a major impact on its capabilities and the future course of the war. Eleven countries are interested in Ukraine’s experience and the database of countless Russian attacks that have trained the artificial intelligence used by the Ukrainians to operate swarms of anti-drone drones.
The war in Iran introduces new strategic elements relevant to the Wider Black Sea Region. While Europe has evolved its interests in the region and has compiled and revised countless strategies, creating new ones as part of the EU’s strategic approach to the Black Sea—the Eastern Partnership, Global Gateway, Black Sea Synergy, the EU Maritime Security Strategy, the Danube Strategy, the EU-Black Sea Joint Maritime Agenda, the Black Sea Research and Innovation Agenda—the U.S. had previously shown signs of diminishing interest in the region, including by blocking troop rotations and reducing the number of military personnel even at Mihail Kogălniceanu in Romania. The war has brought renewed focus to the Black Sea region and the Deveselu missile defense shield, with the US deploying additional equipment and troops to the region, authorized by the Romanian government, featuring defensive and force-projection capabilities, including sensors and the completion of shield components, along with refueling and extended-range tanker aircraft, special telecommunications, etc.
However, we cannot ignore a negative development in the war. As Mikhail Zygar, a Russian journalist and expert on the inner workings of the Kremlin, notes, the elite surrounding Putin—and Putin himself—were considering a potential exit strategy from the war prior to the February 28 attack. This attack dramatically changed the situation, restored some short-term optimism, and took a quick end to the war—with the tail between their legs and significant losses—off the table. Putin’s change of heart regarding exiting the war is attributed to the war in the Gulf, the cost of oil, and the prospect of economic recalibration. In the period leading up to the war, even the negotiator Kirill Dmitriev was set to be replaced by Igor Sechin, a sign of a serious approach to negotiations with the Americans and Ukrainians, given the sale of oil to India at $22 per barrel, for example. Perceptions have shifted, hope has returned, and the aggression is expected to become even bloodier in the coming months.
Strengthening the strategic concept of defending the Western Black Sea region against Russian aggression
Long-standing frameworks for cooperation and mutual defense in the Wider Black Sea Region are taking on particular significance today. Of course, this is primarily based on the NATO membership of three states in the region—Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania—as well as the trilateral MCM cooperation framework for mine clearance and, more recently, its expansion to include the protection of critical marine, surface, and submarine infrastructure. In the same region, we have a system of strategic partnerships—Romania-Turkey, Romania-Poland, and the trilateral Romania-Poland-Turkey partnership—as well as the strategic partnership between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, the trilateral Romania-Republic of Moldova – Ukraine at the level of foreign and energy ministers—but with the ambition to soon raise the level to prime ministers and even a possible return to the trilateral format at the presidential level, as existed in 1997, Emil Constantinescu – Petru Lucinschi-Leonid Kuchma.
We can also highlight the B9 format within the security and defense dimension of the Eastern Flank, given its importance for allied coordination in the run-up to NATO summits and ministerial meetings, as well as through mutual coordination involving the NATO Secretary General and the U.S. President, both of whom have been invited to the upcoming meeting in Bucharest. Security and defense components, including contingency plans, within the NATO context cannot be ignored and add to European concerns regarding maritime security in the Black Sea.
The main and most vexing issue in the region remains Turkey’s rigid interpretation of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which it applies strictly, a factor that worked in its favor during the war, as well as its insistence on strictly regional coordination among the littoral states, as opposed to the allies’ more open approach regarding the need for NATO and EU involvement, both of which are Black Sea littoral organizations. Of course, there is an explicit desire among the states in the region for NATO’s reassurance missions to continue as soon as the conditions of the war permit, with the major importance of involving all allies in the Wider Black Sea Region and avoiding the perception of creating an alliance within the Alliance, which is implied by a strictly regional—and visibly asymmetrical—approach that excludes all but the states of the region from the affairs of the Wider Black Sea Region.
In addition to these well-known strategic developments, the recent signing in Bucharest of the Romania-Ukraine strategic partnership complements the region’s cooperation framework. It complements the trilateral framework and the system of bilateral Romania-Poland-Turkey Strategic Partnerships, forming a three-pillar bridge facing the Black Sea and occupied Crimea, with major relevance to strategic developments and defense frameworks in the region. The partnership, as I have shown (https://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/ce-nu-a-putut-rusia-sa-mai-divida-si-sa-cucereasca-parteneriatul-strategic-romania-ucraina/), with three major instruments of cooperation and coordination between Romania and Ukraine, as well as all the instruments and mechanisms for dialogue, ranging from the presidential commission to joint government meetings, 2+2 strategic consultations at the level of the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and Defense, and annual consultations at the Foreign Affairs level, to which is added cooperation at the level of parliamentary committees.
A Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century: Romania-Ukraine
In the three-document agreement signed in Bucharest, energy cooperation—which is already in place—plays a significant role by supporting Ukraine (as well as the Republic of Moldova) during the war’s most critical moments, especially after the terrible winter Ukraine endured, targeted by attacks on its energy and heating infrastructure in cities far from the front lines and unrelated to Ukraine’s industrial and military production—true war crimes committed by Russia. Added to this is the cooperation agreement for the joint production of military capabilities, primarily drones, with European funding under the €200 million SAFE program, and the related technology transfer from Ukraine, including databases on the interception of Russian drones throughout the war.
Of course, the most important element remains the Strategic Partnership itself, with all its components covered—namely the strategic, security, and defense components, followed by the economic dimension, with its components of economic cooperation, energy, and trade, as well as support for Ukraine’s European integration (and NATO membership, when possible, in accordance with its own aspirations); and the third level, the people-to-people component, encompassing research, technology, academia, and civil society cooperation, which are strengthened and supported as outlined in the document. Regarding the component aimed at European integration, the agreement contains all the elements for de-escalation on the well-known classic issues—minorities, the church, the Romanian language, Bâstroe, and the Espoo Convention—along with specific support for each of the relevant negotiation chapters.
Of course, the Republic of Moldova is not overlooked; it plays a regional role and makes a significant contribution at the trilateral level when it comes to resolving the Transnistrian issue, trilateral infrastructure—including energy cooperation—and the prospects for Ukraine’s reconstruction. The Republic of Moldova is mentioned in the trilateral cooperation and in the Strategic Partnership with its own relevant component, including the Republic of Moldova-Ukraine partnership for European integration supported by Romania and Romania’s efforts to support the opening of negotiations and the acceleration of integration.
All these developments allow for an up-to-date assessment of the strategic landscape and the geopolitical chessboard of the Wider Black Sea Region, the relevant and involved actors, the aspirations of the states in the region, and the various forms of cooperation, particularly in the fields of security and defense. The prospect of an end to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine is neither imminent nor predictable, especially since it carries significant implications for Russia’s leadership, particularly Putin’s septuagenarian administration, which must eventually step down in one form or another. But it holds multiple benefits, both in war and in peace, where Ukraine’s reconstruction, mutually beneficial relations, and shared prosperity will emerge as catalysts for economic development and well-being in the region. Future developments will reveal the true scope of the role and strategic framework for stabilizing the region.
